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THE PUBLIC ENTITY END RUN: GOVERNMENT ACTOR'S
EXCEPTION TO DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
CONSIDERATIONS
UnitedHaulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-HerkimerSolid Waste Management
Authority'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1980's, Oneida and Herkimer Counties were responding to a
"solid waste crisis." 2 Many landfills were operating without permits and
outside the bounds of state regulations; in fact, sixteen were ordered to
close and remediate their surroundings at a substantial cost to the public.3
In response to this problem, Oneida and Herkimer Counties appealed to
the Governor and New York Legislature to create a public benefit
corporation "empowered to collect, process, and dispose of solid waste
generated in the Counties." 4 The resulting Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority built a new facility for the solid waste and
recyclables to address the concerns plaguing the counties.5 In order to
ensure the financial feasibility of the facility, the towns enacted flow
control ordinances 6 which required all haulers to deliver the garbage to the
Authority's facility and pay the above market tipping fee which it
charged.

The Supreme Court addressed similar flow control ordinances once
before in C & A Carbone v. The Town of Clarkstown.8 When the
Supreme Court struck down the flow control ordinance in Carbone two
questions were left unaddressed: 1) whether the facility in Carbone was
'127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).

2United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1790 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1790-91.1791.
4 d.

5

Id.

6 A flow control ordinance "requires all solid waste to be processed at a designated

transfer station before leaving the municipality." C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 385 (1994).
7 UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1791.
8 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386.
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considered a public or private facility, and 2) whether the aforementioned
distinction would change the analysis under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.9 The Supreme Court granted Certiorari in United Haulers in order
to clear up these unanswered questions and settle a circuit split between
the 2nd and 6th Circuits.' 0 This note analyzes the Court's considerations
in reaching their decision.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Respondent, Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority
("the Authority"), is a public benefit corporation under New York Law."
The New York Governor and Legislature formed the Authority in
response to a solid waste "crisis" taking place in the central New York
Counties of Oneida and Herkimer ("the Counties").12 In 1989, the
Authority and the Counties entered into a Solid Waste Management
Contract.13 Under the agreement the Authority took the responsibility of
handling and processing all of the solid waste generated by the Counties.14
The Authority also committed to "purchasing and developing" facilities
for the processing of solid waste and recyclables.' 5 In order to cover the
operating and maintenance costs for the facilities, the Authority charged
"tipping fees" to private haulers.' 6 To ensure that private haulers used the
Authority's facility, and thus paid the tipping fees, the Counties enacted

9See UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1793-94.1786.
'old. at 1792.
" Id. at 1791.1786.
12 Id. at 1790-91 (quotation marks omitted). Responsible for their own waste disposal,
the

counties had relied for years on many local landfills which were operating without
permits and in violation of state regulations. Id. By the 1980's 16 of the local landfills
had been ordered to close and remediate the surrounding environment which costs the
public in the tens of millions of dollars. Id.
Id. at 1791.
4
1 Id. Although, the Authority handled and processed the solid waste,
under the
agreement private haulers were still free to "pick up" citizens trash. Id.
5

id

16 Id. Under

the agreement with the Authority, if the tipping fees and other charges did
not cover the operating costs and debt service of the new facilities then the Counties
would make up the difference. Id.
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"flow control" ordinances which required private haulers to deposit all
solid waste at the Authority's processing sites.17
Petitioner, United Haulers Association, Inc. ("UHA"), is a trade
association composed of solid waste management companies and haulers
operating in the Counties at the time the action was filed.' 8 UHA alleges
that the aforementioned flow control ordinances discriminate against
interstate commerce and thus violate the Commerce Clause.19 In 1995,
UHA brought a section 1983 action against the Counties and the

Authority. 20
17Id. Oneida's

flow control ordinance provides:
"From the time of placement of solid waste and of recyclables at the roadside or
other designated area approved by the County or by the Authority pursuant to
contract with the County, or by a person for collection in accordance herewith,
such solid waste and recyclables shall be delivered to the appropriate facility,
entity or person responsible for disposition designated by the County or by the
Authority pursuant to contract with the Authority."
Id. at 1791 n.2 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United Haulers Ass'n Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 1786 app. at 122a) (No. 05-1345). Herkimer's flow ordinance provides:
"After placement of garbage and of recyclable materials at the roadside or other
designated area approved by the Legislature by a person for collection in
accordance herewith, such garbage and recyclable material shall be delivered to
the appropriate facility designated by the Legislature, or by the Authority
pursuant to contract with the County."
Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United Haulers Ass'n Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1786
app. at 135a) (No. 05-1345).

' Id. at 1792.
9 Id. UHA

showed that the flow control laws forced them to pay an $86-per-ton tipping
fee at the Authority's facility, when absent the flow control they could pay between $37
and $55 per ton at out of state facilities. Id. The Commerce Clause, although it does not
explicitly limit the power of the states, has long been recognized by the Court as acting as
an implicit restraint on state authority (this what's known as the negative or dormant
Commerce Clause). Id. The Commerce Clause provides in relevant part that "Congress
shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States." Id. (quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.).
20
Id. A section 1983 action is appropriate when a person believes a defendant has
deprived him of a constitutional right while acting "under the color" of state law. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 provides in relevant part that "[e]very person who,
under the color of any ... ordinance... of any State or Territory... , subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit at equity, or other proper proceedings for redress..." Id.
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The District Court agreed with UHA. After examining previous
Supreme Court rulings regarding flow controls, the Court interpreted the
rulings as "categorically rejecting" virtually all flow control ordinances. 21
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the lower court for
a decision as to whether an incidental burden on interstate commerce had
been placed on UHA, and if so whether the benefits of the ordinances
outweighed the burden which UHA had to endure .22 On remand the
Magistrate Judge and the District Court found that the ordinances did not
have "any cognizable burden on interstate commerce." 23 Because of a split
between the circuits on the issue of favoring public entities, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 24 The Supreme Court held that when the
Counties' flow ordinances treat in-state and out-of-state private business
interests the same, benefit a government interest, and when any incidental
burden on interstate commerce is outweighed by the local benefit, the
ordinances do not "'discriminate against interstate commerce"' under the
Dormant Commerce Clause.2 5
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The "Dormant" Commerce Clause Doctrine
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides,
"Congress shall have the Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign

Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 26 The
Supreme Court has read this provision to also imply "dormant" 27
UnitedHaulers,127 S. Ct. at 1792. The district court made this assumption after it
examined the Courts ruling in C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Clarkstown. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
22 UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1792. Examining the previous Dormant Commerce
Clause precedents the Second Circuit found a distinction could be made between laws
that
23 benefit the public as opposed to private facilities. Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
24
id
25 Id. at 1797-98.
26 U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl 3.
27 The word "dormant" was first used in connection
with the Commerce Clause and the
right of the federal government to strike down state laws which burden interstate
commerce by Chief Justice John Marshall. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824)
21
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limitations on state and local government's ability to create laws which
burden the flow of interstate commerce, and give the federal courts power
to strike such laws down. 2 8 The Court has reasoned that granting states
such power would allow the states to "retreat[] into economic isolation"
by placing restrictions on the flow of commerce across its borders.2 9
The Supreme Court in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey adopted
a two-part test for the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause. In
creating this test the Court tried to strike a balance between the "evils of
'economic isolation' and protectionism..." and the competing interest of
States in safeguarding the health and safety of it's people.3 1
The Court recognized that in the latter instance, incidental burdens
to interstate commerce "may be unavoidable []."32 For this reason the
Court ruled that they must first apply a "virtually per se rule of invalidity"
where the effect of state legislation is simple economic protectionism. 33
According to a later opinion of the Court, "The central rationale for the
rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose
object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those
jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to
prevent." 34 It is important to note, however, that the definition of
discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not limited
only to legislation where the objective is discrimination.3 5 As one
(saying "[the power to regulate interstate commerce] can never be exercised by the
people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant.").
28 See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514
U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995).
29 Id. The Court also states that the provision "reflect[s] a central concern
of the Framers
that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction
that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among
the States under the Articles of Confederation." Id. at 80 (citingWardair Can. Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986); see also The Federalist Nos. 42 (James
Madison), 7, 11 (Alexander Hamilton)).
30 City of Phila. v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617,
624 (1978).
3
3

2

Id. at 623-24.

Id.
Id. at 624 (emphasis in the original).
34 Carbone., 511 U.S. at 390.
3 Bradford C. Mank, Are Public FacilitiesDifferent From Private Ones?: Adopting a
New StandardofReview for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. REv. 157, 164
(2007).
33
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commentator importantly pointed out, the Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis considers the discriminatory effects of the legislation, making the
Court's definition of discrimination in Dormant Commerce Clause cases
significantly broader than the definition in Equal Protection cases.3 6
The second part of the two part test is that, "where the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental" the Court will apply
the test laid out in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.3 7 The Court in Pike ruled
that when a legitimate local public interest is identified with only
incidental effects on interstate commerce, "it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits." 38 In creating this balancing test, however, the
Court in Pike gave only a vague explanation of how the test should be
applied. 39 The Court indicated that the question becomes one of degree
once a legitimate local purpose is found. The Court then qualified its
statement as to the burden that would be tolerated saying that it will "of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities. 0
Although clear in theory, as Courts have taken this test and applied
it to local laws with alleged discriminatory purposes it has been frequently
unclear whether to apply the per se test or the Pike test.4 1
B. TroubledApplication: C & A Carbone,Inc
In C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Town of Clarkston,42 the United States
Supreme Court examined a flow control ordinance placed on solid waste

36

Id. Discrimination in the Equal Protection context only prohibits "laws with
discriminatory purposes or intentions but not ones with discriminatory effects." Id.
37 City ofPhilidelphia,437 U.S. at 624 (referencing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.

137, 142 (1978)).
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Mank, supra note 35, at 165.
4 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
41 Mank, supra note 35, at 165.
42 Carbone, 511 U.S.
at 383.
38
3
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processors operating in the Town of Clarkson ("the Town"). 43 The flow
control ordinance was created in response to a consent decree the Town
entered into with the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation in August of 1989." Under the decree the Town agreed to
close its landfill, and build a new solid waste transfer station.45 In order to
deliver on their promise to build a new transfer station the town entered
into an agreement with a private contractor to build the new facility and
operate it for the first 5 years.46 Under the agreement the Town guaranteed
a minimum waste flow of 120,000 tons a year, at a tipping fee of $81
dollars a ton to the contractor.4 7 At the end of the 5 years the Town could
buy back the facility for only $1. The object of the agreement with the
contractor was to amortize the cost of the cost of the transfer station with
income generated by the tipping fees.48 The town enacted the ordinance at
issue 49 in order to make sure that the transfer facility met its yearly
guarantee. 50
Writing for the five Justice majority5 ' in the Carbone decision,
Justice Kennedy examined the effect of the ordinance. 52 The Court
determined that, "[w]hile the immediate effect of the ordinance is to direct
local transport of solid waste to a designated site within the local
jurisdiction, it's economic effects are interstate in reach." 53 The Court
reasoned that because this ordinance made it more expensive for out-ofstate businesses who use the Clarkstown transfer station, and because it
43

1Id. at 387.
4Id.at 386-87.
45
Id. at 387.
46

47

Id. The disposal price of $81 was more than the disposal cost on the private market,
and if the 120,000 ton guarantee is not met the town is responsible for the tipping fee
deficit. Id.

48 id.

The ordinance at issue is Local Laws 1990, No. 9 of the Town of Clarkstown. Id.;
Clarkstown, N.Y., Local Laws No. 9 (1990).

49

51Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia Thomas, and Ginsburg.
52Id. at

389.
Id. (emphasis added). This reflects the premise that the profitable portion of the
garbage business is not the garbage itself, but the fact that people must pay to dispose and
process it. Id. at 390-91.
1

3
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deprived out-of-state business access to the local waste disposal market a
Commerce Clause analysis was appropriate. 54
The Majority, while acknowledging the Pike balancing test,
chose to apply the per se test, stating that:
[d]iscrimination
against
interstate
commerce in favor of local business or
investment is per se invalid, save in a
narrow class of cases in which the
municipality can demonstrate, under
rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means
to advance a legitimate local interest.56
The Majority concluded that the Town had failed to meet the narrow
exception. 57 The Court noted that Clarkstown had "any number of
nondiscriminatory alternatives" which they could use to accomplish the
goal of the health and environmental concerns used as justification for the
ordinance.58 The Majority never analyzed the ordinance under the Pike
test; however both the concurrence and the dissent felt that this was the
proper vehicle to analyze the ordinance. 59
Justice Souter, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Blackmun joined, filed a dissenting opinion. 60 The dissenting opinion
focused on two differences which they say should "prevent this case from
being decided [for C & A Carbone]." 6' First, the dissent looked at the fact
54

1d. at 389.
at 390.
56 Id. at 392 (emphasis
in original).
57
1d. at 393.
Id. The Court suggested that uniform safety regulations would have accomplished the
same goal without the discriminatory effects. Id.
5 Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, but disagreeing in the
analysis. Id at 401. She argued that the Town's ordinance was unconstitutional based on
its excessive burden on interstate commerce, not because of any "facial or effective
discrimination against interstate commerce." Id. Justice O'Connor applied the Pike test
and determined that the interests could be promoted just as well through other means
which would have a lesser impact on interstate activities such as specific standards for
town processors, and taxes to ensure financial viability. Id. at 405-06.
6 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at
416.
5

1Id.
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that the ordinance favored one single processor, instead of the general
class of local processors. 62 The dissent pointed out, that in the past when
the Court had struck down processing laws it was because they benefited
local firms at the expense of their out-of-town competitors. 63 The dissent
argued that because this ordinance did not discriminate against a class of
out-of-town processors, but rather treats all in-state and out-of-state actors
the same choosing to favor a single municipal64 processor that it is not
protectionist in its application. 65
Second, the dissent looked at the public nature of the facility.6 6
Justice Souter states that "Clarkstown's transfer station is essentially a
municipal facility... soon to revert entirely to municipal ownership." 67 He
focused on the function the facility performed and stated that both
tradition as well as state and federal law recognized trash removal as the
domain of local government. 68 Justice Souter contended that a public
facility occupied a different market position than a private facility.69 He
recognized little reason other than economic protectionism to benefit a
private interest; however, he pointed out that a local government could
enter the market in order to serve the citizens rather than amass wealth. 70
Justice Souter believes that a "more particularized enquiry" must
be made before the ordinance, which prefers the government, can be
struck down.7 ' For this reason he abandons the "virtually fatal" per se test

62 id

Id. The Court quoted one commentator summarizing the case law
in this area,
describing this type of unconstitutional category of laws as laws "adopted for the
purpose of improving the competitive position of local economic actors , just because
they are local, vis-A-vis their foreign competitors[.]" Id at 417 (quoting Donald H.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1184 (1986) (Internal quotation marks
omitted)).
6 Justice Souter argues that this should be a considered a municipal facility.
65 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 418.
63

66Id.
at
6

7
id.
68

419.

id.

69

1d. at

420-21.

7o d. at 421.
71

Id. at 422.
443
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and argues for the more lenient Pike standard. 72 For purposes of the Pike
test the majority found that the monopolistic nature of the ordinance was
not fatal under the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 73 Additionally
they found that the higher prices charged by the facility were not fatal to
its constitutionality. 74 For the benefit side of the Pike equation the dissent
looked not only to the financing of the facility, but he also points out that
because the cost is proportional to how much trash one generated there
was also a benefit in trash deterrence. Ultimately, the dissent reached the
opposite conclusion of Justice O'Connor, who also applied the Pike test in
her concurrence, finding that the ordinance was constitutional and should
be upheld.7s

C. CircuitSplit Stemming from Justice Souter's Dissent
Since the decision in Carbone the Circuit Courts have been unable
to reach a consensus on whether the rule laid down was meant to apply to
both public and private facilities76 , or whether like Justice Souter's dissent
suggested that a different test is applicable in the case of a public
facility.77
The Second Circuit in United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Management Authority reversed a district court
decision which compared the municipal corporation in the case to the
private corporation in Carbone, and thus applied the per se test striking
the flow ordinances down. In striking down the District Court ruling the
Court stated that, "the district court erred in its Commerce Clause analysis
72

Id. at 422-23.

Id. at 424. The dissent points out that the "authority to dismember and penalize
[monopolies] ... arises from a statutory, not a constitutional, mandate." Id
74 id
" Id. at 430.
7 See Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v.
Davis County Ky., 434 F.3d 898 (6th Cir. 2006)
(applying the Carboneper se approach);compare with United Haulers Ass'n v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 261 F.3d 245 (2nd Cir. 2001), and United Haulers
Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 438 F.3d 150 (2nd Cir. 2006)
(applying the Pike test and recognizing the difference between public and private
facilities.)
n Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
71 UnitedHaulers,261 F.3d
at 252, 264.
7
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by failing to recognize the distinction between private and public
ownership of the favored facility." 79 The Court found that there was a
distinction and that the Pike balancing test should be applied in the case of
public facilities.8 0 The Court later determined that the ordinances were
valid under the Pike test when "the challenged laws do not treat similarly
situated in-state and out-of-state business interests differently." 8 '
In a case involving similar municipal ordinances, the Sixth Circuit
in National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Daviess Co., Ky criticized
the Second Circuit's ruling in United Haulers.82 In the Sixth Circuit's
opinion the Court pointed out that the facts in Carbone clearly indicate
that the facility was public, and for this reason Carbone should apply to
the instant case.83 The Court stated that determining a government-run
business is public "does not cloak ... facially protectionist activity from

the appropriate scrutiny under the Commerce Clause." 84 The Court
therefore upheld the District Court ruling that the ordinances violated the
Commerce Clause. 85
IV. Instant Decision
The United Haulers Court began by laying a foundation for
"dormant" Commerce Clause analysis. 86 The Court stated that the first
question in this analysis is whether the ordinance facially discriminates
against interstate commerce. 8 7 The Court noted that laws motivated by
"simple economic protectionism"8 are subject to a rule of virtually per se

" Id. at 257.

so1d. at 264.
United Haulers,438 F.3d at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v.82 Daviess Co., 434
F.3d 898, 912 (6th Cir. 2006)..
81

83 Id
84

id.

8

sId. at 913.
"
8 7 Id. at 1793.
Id The Court defines discrimination in this context as "'differential treatment of
instate and out-of-state economic interests that benefit the former and burden the latter."'Id.
(quoting Ore. Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93,
99 (1994); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)).
88 Daviess Co., 434 F.3d at 1793 (Internal
quotation marks omitted).
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invalidity that is only overcome by a showin that the State had no other
means to advance a legitimate local purpose.
The Court then explained reasons for different treatment of public
entities and private businesses. 90 The Court noted that unlike private
entities, governments have the responsibility of protecting the "health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens." 9 1 Given the differences, the Court
commented that it does not make sense to treat laws favoring government
and those favoring private industry the same. 92 The Court reasoned that a
law which favors an in-state business over a business from out-of-state is
subject to "rigorous scrutiny" because it is often the product of "simple
economic protectionism". 93 There is a difference, however, when those
laws favor a local government because, according to the Court, "laws

89

Id (quoting Philadelphia v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); citing Me. v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 138 (1986)).
90 Id at 1794. UHA urged the Court to treat the majorities silence in Carboneon the
issue of the facilities being public or private as agreement with the dissents
characterization in Carbone that facility was public. Id. The inference being that the same
rules should apply to both public and private interests. Id. The Authority argued that the
silence can not be taken as agreement, rather that the majority "studiously" avoided the
issue of whether public facilities could be favored because the facility in Carbonewas
private, thus the question was not properly before the Court. Id. The Court ultimately
decides that the later view is the correct one. Id. The Court notes that the dissent in
Carboneoffered many reasons why public entities should be treated different from
private ones under the Dormant Commerce Clause and that it would be "hard to suppose"
the majority would have rejected the dissents argument without explaining why. Id. The
Court also states that if the Carbone court was extending its rejection of the ordinances to
cover discrimination in favor of local government that they would expect them to do so in
plain and explicit terms. Id. (citing U. S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (No. 14,693) (CC Va.
1807) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[A]n opinion which is to ... establish a principle never before
recognized, should be expressed in plain and explicit terms")).
91 Id. at 1795 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) ("The States
traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons") (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Id.
9 Id.at 1795-96 (quoting Wyo. v. Okla., 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Philadelphia v. N.J.,
437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)).
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favoring local government... may be directed toward any number of
legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism." 94
In addition to the above considerations, the Court was also hesitant
to intrude into the Counties' regulation of waste disposal because it is both
"typically and traditionally a local government function."95 In the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Congress even noted
the local government's role in waste management by stating, "collection
and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function
of State, regional, and local agencies." 96
The Court's final analysis focuses on the test set forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.97 Under the Pike test, a law "directed to legitimate
local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only
incidental" 98 is held to be nondiscriminatory "unless the burden imposed
on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits." 99 The Court found that any arguable burden the ordinance
produced did not exceed the benefits provided to the public.' 00 The Court
recognized that a major function of the ordinance is to finance the wastedisposal services the Authority provides.' 0 ' Although County revenue
94

Id. at 1796. "The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and
Localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, but it does not
elevate free trade above all other values."Id (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Me. v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986)). See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437
U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (Commerce Clause does not protect "'the particular structure or
method"' of a market.).
95 Id.
(quoting United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
261 F.3d 245, 264 (2d Cir. 2001)). See also USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66
F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir. 1995) ("For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage
collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States")
(internal quotation marks omitted)).; M. Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform,
and the Environment, 1880-1980, at 153-55 (1981)).
96
Id. (quoting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
6901(a)(4) (2000)).
97
d.at 1797 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
98
Id. (quoting.Philadelphia v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
99 Id. (quoting
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).; N.W. Central
Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp.Corporation Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 525-26 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
'00Id.
'o'Id. at 1798.
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generation is "not a local interest that can justify discrimination against
interstate commerce" the Court stated that it believes the Counties receive
a cognizable benefit for the purpose of the Pike test.102
Ultimately, the Court held that county flow ordinances, like those
imposed by Oneida and Herkimer counties, do not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause when they treat in-state and out-of-state private
business interests the same, they benefit a government interests, and any
incidental burden on interstate commerce is not excessive in relation to the
local benefit. 0 3
V. COMMENT
There is no doubt that the flow control ordinance imposed by
Oneida and Herkimer counties could have been "directed toward any
number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism."l04 However, the
question as to what justified the courts departure from its ruling in
Carbone is perhaps more controversial. 0 5
As the dissent in United Haulers points out, the Court has always
subjected discriminatory legislation to strict scrutiny, and never before had
it recognized an exception for state-owned entities.106 In addition to this
departure from the Court's long history of applying strict scrutiny, the
distinction the majority drew between the facilities in Carbone and United
Haulers is essentially a distinction without a difference. The dissent is
correct in pointing out that by making the distinction the majority "exalts
form over substance []."'0 Additionally, the Court gives little guidance on
Id. (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. 386, 393 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 1797-98. Justice Thomas and Scalia filed separate concurrences. Id. at 17981801.1798-801. Justice Alito, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy joined
filed a dissent discussed infra. The dissent urged that the instant case can not be
meaningfully distinguished from Carbone.Id. at 1803. As such they believe that in ruling
for the Authority the Court "exalt[ed] form over substance in adopting a test that turns on
[a] ... technical distinction, particularly since, barring any obstacle presented by state
law, the transaction in Carbone could have been restructured to provide for the passage
of title at the beginning, rather than the end of the 5-year [private] period." Id at 1804-05.
'0 Id. at 1796.
105See generally Carbone,511 U.S. 383.
'06 UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1805-06.
07 Id. at 1804.
102

103
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what "legitimate goals" in which it would be willing to allow the states to
indulge.' 08
A. Distinction Without a Difference

The majority uses an arbitrary difference to distinguishes the
facilities in United Haulers are from those in Carbone. A distinction
which the dissent noted, "barring any obstacle presented by the state ...
could have been restructured ... [to satisfy the United Hauler's test]."10 9
In Carbone the facility was built by a contractor for the city free of
charge." 0 In return for building the transfer station the city guaranteed
that for the first five years after construction the contractor would receive,
"a minimum waste flow of 120,000 tons per year" for which he could
charge an above market tipping fee of $81."' At the end of the 5 'ear
period the contractor would sell the facility back to Clarkston for $1."
The situation in UnitedHaulers is not all that distinguishable from
the situation in Carbone, both involved the building of a new waste
transfer station, and both involved what could fairly be characterized as a
financing measure on the part of the town or municipality. In United
Haulers, however, there was no five-year waiting period for Oneida and
Herkimer counties, the facility was built by a state-created public benefit
corporation which took title immediately."
After the holding in United Haulers, C & A Carbone, Inc. could
have simply turned the title to the plant over to the town of Clarkstown in
exchange for a note, and resumed the plant's normal operation. While the
Court attempted to provide a bright line rule, they just provided
municipalities with an end run around Dormant Commerce Clause
considerations.

os"Id at 1796.
'0Id at 1804-05.
1n0 Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
11 Id
113 UnitedHaulers,127 S. Ct. at 1790.
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B. What is a Legitimate Goal?
As long as the state or municipality is directing the questionable
legislation toward "legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism""14 and
they are treating in-state and out-of-state private business interests the
same, then the legislation does not discriminate for purposes of the
Dormant Commerce Clause." 5 The question then arises what is and is not
a legitimate goal for the states. At oral argument the Court used an
exaggerated analogy to make the point that this holding had broad
implications.116 The Court created the idea of an "Oneida-Herkimer
Hamburger Stand" and it's hypothetical "flow control" requiring residents
to buy their burgers only from the aforementioned stand. In the opinion
the Court responded to this hypothetical by stating that, "[r]ecognizing
that local government may facilitate a customary and traditional
government function such as waste disposal, without running afoul of the
Commerce Clause, is hardly a prescription for state control of the
economy." 1 8
While the end the government seeks to pursue may be a legitimate
one, equating discriminatory legislation to a simple facilitation is a drastic
understatement of the means used to achieve it. The dissent in United
Haulers makes this oversight by the majority particularly clear by citing
the Court's willingness to "repeatedly invalidate[] legislation where 'a
presumably legitimate goal was sought to be achieved by the illegitimate
means of isolating the State from the national economy."'9
IV. CONCLUSION

Although some Justices, such as Thomas, see the Dormant
Commerce Clause as activity, now largely rebuked, similar to the type of
economic policy making which was engaged in by the Lochner court;
114 1d at 1796.

115id

116

Id. at 1796 n.7.
Id
" 8 1d (emphasis added).
9Id at 1808 (Alito, J., dissenting)1806 (citing Philadelphia v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617, 627
(1978)).
17
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whether they like it or not the Court seems unwilling to depart from this
analysis.120 The Court in United Haulers has instead "tweak[ed]" the
Dormant Commerce Clause to provide an exception for government
actors.121 Essentially, what the Supreme Court has done in United
Haulers is provide local governments with an end run around Dormant
Commerce Clause considerations to pursue whatever goal they like, as
long as it's not protectionism through discriminatory means. The Court in
United Haulers took a step away from its analysis in Carbone, however,
by granting such a broad exception, they may have opened the door for
Oneida and Herkimer counties in such a way that it will not easily be
closed. Going forward it should be interesting to see how the Court deals
with what is sure to be an increase in questionably protectionist local
legislation, let's just hope that Oneida and Herkimer counties are content
with regulating trash flow and stay out of the hamburger business.
RYAN TICHENOR

12 0
121

See id. at 1798-1803 (Scalia, J., concurring and Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1802 (Thomas, J., concurring)..
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